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Southeast Asian Studies has always had a strong commitment to publishing the best of empirically
grounded, fieldwork-based or archival research in area studies. With this issue, we introduce a new
section that presents articles by leading scholars in their respective fields. This section offers fresh,
innovative, and wide-ranging perspectives on themes and issues of both immediate and long-term
interest to Southeast Asia specialists.
Comparing States and Regions in East Asia and Europe:
Is Southeast Asia (ever) part of East Asia?*
Roy Bin WDC<**
Abstract
This essay considers ways in which China and an “East Asia” which includes Southeast
Asia can both be compared to Europe in ways that help us appreciate the limitations of
conceptualizing political processes largely through practices pioneered in European histo-
ry. Contrasts between political institutions in China and Europe historically and today in
turn suggest the flexible ways in which “region” can mediate between the global and the
local levels of analysis. Through historical and comparative arguments this essay simulta-
neously reframes the debates on area studies and on regionalism and regional integration
in ways that open up new lines of inquiry and a new agenda for research under the rubric
of “East Asia.” The essay argues that we need to attend to patterns of spatial similarities
and connections, as well as differences, to better understand how regions were historically
constructed and how these constructions shape the possibilities and limits of region-
thinking and making.
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The Importance and Difficulties of Considering Regions in a Global Age
Globalization has changed not only the way we look at the present and future. It has also
contributed to a re-evaluation of how we view the past. Terms like “global history” and
“world history” have become common in American universities and are also increasingly
found in Europe and Asia. Social scientists and humanists whose research topics a
generation ago were framed within national contexts have moved beyond the borders of
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helpful critiques of Sugihara Kaoru and an anonymous reviewer for the journal.
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earlier work to examine connections that span great distances, be they looking at the
movements of people, ideas, goods, or diseases. Teaching has also changed to embrace the
human and natural networks of relations that produced elements of the past we share
and promise to create a common future.
The rush to focus on global issues and highlight connections across vast distances
has made the recognition of variations across space more difficult to achieve. Humanists
and qualitative social scientists engage in few efforts at a comparative level. One
common logic of contemporary social sciences and humanities that avoids seeking more
systematic comparisons ties a particular case to its global influences and then claims the
“global” must be seen in the “local” and the “local” to be created by its ties to the “global.”
This makes it difficult for us to generalize from particular cases other than to say that
everywhere is subject to global influences and each displays its local characteristics. We
affirm a universalism driven by global factors at the same time as we allow for particular
features that come out of local situations without considering ways to organize the
variations we can find among a number of local cases. What spatial units exist between
the local case and the world at large within which and between which we might look at
similarities and differences?
Regions which are more than individual countries but far less than the entire globe
provide an obvious, and I will suggest, a necessary spatial frame of evaluation. Yet, they
are not fixed and formal units; they can be and indeed have been defined in multiple and
competing ways. After World War II American academia and government conceptualized
regions according to an “area studies” definition based on clusters of languages and
countries distinguished by their geopolitical positions in an American-dominated world.
Countries were key units within area studies; their histories were tied to shared cultural
elements and in some cases to the notion of a common civilization. In the more recent
past, the EU’s formation has given us a different standard according to which we can
conceptualize regions. For historians there have been other regional studies of great
importance, perhaps most famously Fernand Braudel’s study of the sixteenth-century
Mediterranean, which began with the land bordering the sea and moved through the
connections spanning the Mediterranean and carrying some of its merchants to Asia
[Braudel ]. Making this physical space into a historical region was one of the major
contributions of Braudel’s work and it subsequently inspired Asian specialists to consider
the possible presence of similar maritime spaces. From the combination of Braudel’s
seminal work and the work that has followed, we can see reasons why the concept of
region is both useful and difficult to use.)





Maritime Asia(s) and East Asia(s): Multiple Choices
The multiple definitions of maritime Asia(s) developed by different authors may make us
skeptical that any of them should be taken very seriously. It would be difficult, if not
impossible, to get most scholars to agree on a single spatial unit of maritime Asia. But we
may not want a single definition of a maritime Asian region most simply because there
is no sea similarly bounded as the Mediterranean in Asia. In addition, a bit of reflection
might suggest that the absence of any clearly defined maritime Asia alerts us to the
changing dimensions of such a space over time that indicates the number, density and
diversity of links, all of which can vary. If we want to examine how different kinds of
connections form human networks of relations across particular physical spaces, we need
not agree on the exact dimensions of such spaces. Presence in a particular region doesn’t
preclude membership in another; a periphery linked by certain ties to the core of a large
region may also come under the influence of some other center either in different ways
or in different historical periods. The multiple definitions of either “East Asia” or a
“maritime Asia” “region” advertise the virtues of a flexible approach to identifying
geographical spaces that exist between the local and the global. How then do we choose
among different possible regional units we might wish to consider? In part, our choices
must relate to the kinds of research or teaching purposes we have. Thinking consciously
about the spatial dimensions of our research purposes and teaching goals can in fact help
us to refine the subjects themselves. I will examine political transformations as an
example of where a regional focus is helpful. First, however, let me acknowledge the
academic reasons for making a political division between East Asia and Southeast Asia.
In the United States, Southeast Asian specialists often feel beleaguered if not belit-
tled by the far larger academic presence of scholars working on China, Japan and Korea.
Area studies more generally has been harshly criticized in the United States for being the
product of a post-World War II political environment in which the world was divided into
regions according to the priorities and concerns of government leaders.) Southeast Asian
Studies in the United States is thus doubly marginalized, seeking recognition as an area
of research and teaching both within area studies and in the humanities and social
science disciplines that have been skeptical and at times even hostile toward area
specialists. The desire to achieve academic acceptability on a broader and deeper basis in
the U. S. makes Southeast Asian specialists loathe to consider themselves simply as
members of some larger group of scholars and to have their subject area subsumed under
some larger spatial rubric. The academic price of intellectual separation to foster profes-
sional identity and autonomy has been a precarious position at the margins of American
 For example, Harootunian and Sakai [].
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universities. While it is difficult to imagine any Southeast Asian specialist in the United
States accepting intellectually the notion that Southeast Asia can be studied as part of
East Asia, East Asian subjects in fact spill over into Southeast Asia repeatedly.
Consider a few examples from different periods of history. Southeast Asia’s original
inhabitants arrived from Austronesia, but many of those who later migrated into the
region came from the Chinese mainland where those who remained became minorities
outnumbered by Han Chinese. Sharing a common rice agriculture and technologies like
bronze bell casting, similarities between and connections among those living in south
China were in some ways greater with people in Southeast Asia than with those in north
China during China’s early imperial era (Qin-Han dynasties and subsequent centuries of
political fragmentation) [Higham ]. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,
maritime trade connected Southeast and Northeast Asian ports as well as Chinese ports
in a web of commercial relations into which Europeans would arrive and occupy only
minor positions; Chinese links with Southeast Asia remained strong through the eight-
eenth and well into the nineteenth centuries. Only in the second half of the nineteenth
century did the formation of a Western-dominated international trade system reduce the
salience and significance of trade links within East and Southeast Asia [Momoki and
Hasuda ]. In the s the Japanese began to develop a vision of regional empire that
ultimately included Southeast Asian sites in addition to China and Korea; their imperial-
ist vision embraced sites from Northeast to Southeast Asia as components of a larger East
Asia that complemented the German ambitions of achieving a kind of regional integra-
tion of Europe under its leadership [Peattie 		]. The  financial crisis, sometimes
labeled an “East Asian” financial crisis in the press, included both Thailand and Indonesia
along with Korea as countries severely affected by sudden capital outflows and currency
collapses; in this instance what united these countries was a common vulnerability to
unstable financial flows which prompted regional responses intended to prevent subse-
quent repetition of such crises.) Finally, in the opening decade of the twenty-first century
discussions of an “East Asian Community” modeled on some features of European
integration have been discussed and debated by academics in China, Japan and South
Korea, as well as Southeast Asia where the initiative of ASEAN to involve China, Japan
and South Korea in regional discussions (ASEAN  ) has led to some policy makers and
academics affirming a vision of an East Asia that very much includes Southeast Asia
[Yoshino ; Oya et al. ].
One period that lacks much evidence of connections and shared concerns across East
Asia and Southeast Asia begins after World War II when the two areas were largely
defined as separate spaces politically and academically in the United States. Conceived as
regions composed of national states, those of Southeast Asia were shaped by a history of
Western colonialism, while East Asia was made up of national states formed in different





circumstances. China’s political isolation and Japan’s focus upon domestic economic
recovery and development in the s meant that they lacked intense and significant
relations to Southeast Asian countries. Not only could “East Asia” and “Southeast Asia”
be conceived as separate areas in the United States, but most East Asian specialists in
American universities worked exclusively or at least primarily on only one country
within East Asia. So too did Southeast Asian specialists work principally on a single
country but the paucity of specialists meant they were more likely to stress their
academic kinship than were East Asian specialists who could form meaningful com-
munities with others who worked on their country of specialization without reference to
other countries in East Asia. These scholarly proclivities fit well with American
policymakers’ preferences for thinking in bilateral terms for diplomatic and economic
relations rather than in regional terms. The political and academic reasons for the
post-World War II formulation of separate East and Southeast Asian areas and the
relative insignificance of regional units of analysis were the product of a particular
historical moment when national states loomed large and the United States asserted its
preeminence in the arenas of international political and economic relations in a competi-
tion with the Soviet-led bloc of Communist countries.) East Asia mattered little as a
spatial unit for analysis or action, whether or not Southeast Asia was seen as part of the
region or not. National states, the importance of which became increasingly visible
through the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, were fundamentally important for
much of the second half of the twentieth century both as key units of study and analysis
and as the collective actors between which activities beyond the nation and state were
organized.
Since the collapse of the USSR and the increasingly dense and diverse connections
defining contemporary conditions across the globe, we have left a world of national
states joined largely through bilateral relations politically and economically. Our new
conditions have prompted scholars across the humanities and social sciences to criticize
studies that treat national states as the only meaningful units of observation and
analysis. Some of us imagine we have escaped the straitjacket of national states as the
subject of history and object of historical study because we examine small subjects in big
settings, moving between our local subjects and some global context. Yet, we are never
that far from nations and their states because we have not collectively filled the void
between the local and global in an orderly way that makes clear the ways that nations
and their states do and do not matter to understanding the world around us today and in
the past. What we are missing is much needed additional attention to the geographies of
 Early issues of the Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars critique the government’s role in
formulating the area studies approach. See Gilman [: ] for a discussion of how
area studies fit within the Cold War political logic of a major architect of American policy
strategy, Walt Rostow.
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connections that emerge in the spaces beyond national states that are far less than global.
We need to fill in the spaces between local and global in order to understand the world
around us. I suggest in this essay that a reconsideration of regional spaces like “East Asia”
and “Southeast Asia” can help us mediate between the local and global as we put national
states in broader contexts. As we think about how regional spaces in general matter, we
can also ponder if or when it can be helpful to consider “Southeast Asia” to be a part of
some larger “East Asia.” This contemporary challenge also includes understanding
histories that occur between the local and global scales of our human and natural worlds.
Thinking about how connected “Southeast Asia” and “East Asia” have been histori-
cally is challenging because the indicators for integration or connection can either rise or
fall depending on whether the link or relationship is economic, political, social or cultural.
In addition, over the longue durée from the early modern to modern eras there are more
connections within regions (however defined) and between them in a more global
context. Thus, the kinds of connections within a region could increase at the same time
as those links become sensible as part of a larger spatial pattern of changes. In early
history migrations of people and technologies between the southern Chinese mainland
and mainland Southeast Asia may have created significant ties at a time when the region
had few links to other parts of Eurasia, yet those connections were no doubt far less dense
than the patterns of migration and trade that emerged in the late nineteenth century
when the region was itself becoming more integrated into global networks of trade and
migration. Actors external to the region can play a major role in promoting or limiting
linkages within the region as American government policy makers clearly did in the Cold
War era.
The different connections and shared features between “East Asia” and “Southeast
Asia” earlier in this essay are usually only noticed by individuals concerned with
particular problems or processes important to specific periods of history. Because we
conventionally organize our histories of East and Southeast Asia separately from each
other, we are unlikely to consider the ways in which the linkages might together tell us
something about this part of the world that cannot be easily perceived when the areas are
treated separately. Because the conventional spatial units into which we organize re-
search and teaching about different parts of the world are national we are little inclined
to scrutinize our choices about defining areas that are not formal political units. We allow
these formal political units to be our standard vehicles for studying many subjects, even
those that occur before the emergence of today’s national states.
Reframing National States in a Global Age: The Relevance of Regions
National states have been a durable focus for enquiry because their contemporary
existence is buttressed by claims about history. One of the main purposes of looking into
  	
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history has been to create national pasts as a means to promote a shared social identity
in the present and point people toward a common future, often under a political regime
that bolsters its legitimacy by representing the people as a nation. Museums house
artifacts documenting a country’s early history while its libraries and archives contain
written records of its language being used for diverse purposes. Yet our awareness of
documents and artifacts that bear witness to a past that informs our present says little
about what assumptions the producers of these treasures had about who they were or
what would follow them. Few of them likely had any inkling that their activities would
some day be seen as contributions to the national heritages of societies and states that
became the units in which nineteenth and twentieth-century people organized them-
selves and saw others. While historians understand the anachronistic quality of attribut-
ing to earlier people the sensibilities of those living in later historical periods, some study
people constructing their national pasts rather than the past itself.)
As scholars, we need to mount our own expeditions into the past in order to give
accounts of how people organized their lives and how social and material worlds were
transformed by their actions, sometimes deliberately, sometimes as unintended conse-
quences, and often in ways they could not have anticipated. To do so we need spatial
categories encouraging us to identify the distinctive traits of particular times and places
and the activities that created processes of change transforming people and the worlds
around them. The discredited categories once conventionally used to capture distinctive
features of different parts of the world were “civilizations.”
Exercises of differentiation among civilizations favored the selection of traits
deemed essential to understanding the characteristics of one civilization compared to
others. They necessarily simplified complex and diverse patterns of belief and behavior
within each civilization. Because much of the written and archaeological record concerns
elites, the lives of common people were also easily slighted. When scholars became
skeptical of the usefulness or even plausibility of grand comparisons and when many of
them became more interested in considering complexities and differences within civiliza-
tions, the category of “civilization” became less necessary and less desirable. It has not
been replaced because scholars refrained during the middle decades of the twentieth
century from making grand comparisons across a wide sweep of times and places.
The development in the late twentieth century of “world” and “global” history has
created a new intellectual context within which to consider the possibilities of spatial
units that work for the study of periods before and beyond national states. We have not
taken this to be a crucial task because so many of the best studies produced under the
rubric of world history and global history stress connections among widely separated
places. These studies traverse large stretches of territory that take no form or shape
because they are not themselves objects of study. The places at either end of these great
 For representative scholarship in this field see the journal History and Memory.
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distances are the areas from which migrants come or go and they are the areas producing
and consuming the ideas and objects brought by people moving between them. We learn
that there were many important ways that people have been engaged with each other
over very great distances long before our contemporary era of globalization.)
A second strand in early modern global history has made us aware of dynamism
in the world beyond Europe. The presence of parallel processes of commercial expan-
sions, cultural consolidations, and state building efforts, to name a few of the major
changes scholars have analyzed, has made Europe far less unique than previously
assumed.) But these arguments are only slowly changing our views of historical changes
in more recent times. The parallels that scholars have found in early modern times mean
that people outside of Europe (and their states, economies and societies) were capable of
historical change, but none of them achieved independently of Europe either industrial
capitalism or sovereign national states. Conceiving the modern era largely in terms of the
spread of European ideas and institutions has left us ill equipped for understanding what
accounts for the varied characteristics of regions in today’s world of capitalism and
national states. We know the world is now moving well beyond the formation of
European national states and industrialization, but have yet adequately to take the
measure of how historical processes of change in other parts of the world have con-
tributed to producing distinctive possibilities in different parts of the world.
We need now, perhaps more than ever, to consider what the study of regions that are
conceived as spaces within which historical processes similar to as well as different from
those taking place in other regions mattered not only before these regions became more
closely connected, but also to the modern world that we previously have seen as a
distinctly European creation. The histories of other world regions affect what we see
today around us, but sometimes in ways we find hard to appreciate because our
expectations for what should exist globally remain strongly informed by what happened
first in Europe.
European Perspectives on Recent Political Transformations
in Asia and Europe
Most scholars agree on two major and entwined historical processes that have formed the
modern world, even if their explanations for the processes differ. For almost every
observer the formation of European national states and development of European
industrial capitalism are the two master processes that have carried humanity more
generally from what was once called the Dark Ages after the collapse of the Roman
 For example, McNeill [] and Crosby [].





Empire to the nineteenth and twentieth-century possibilities for economic riches and
political satisfactions. More specifically these processes first made modern Europe and
the neo-Europes formed by white settler societies and then defined the norms according
to which historical changes in the rest of the world have been judged. We use the metrics
of an industrial democracy to judge the economies and political regimes of countries
around the world. Even as we sense our world moving beyond national states and into a
post-industrial age we are slow to change the lens through which we observe and
evaluate the world. And when we do make changes, they often remain rooted in
European experiences.
Consider the dynamics of political change and the ways “region” has entered into
contemporary politics and social science research. We used to believe that the formation
of democratic national states was the endpoint of political development, but the emerg-
ence of the European Union has led scholars and policy makers to revise what had been
an unquestioned understanding of modern political thinking about basic institutional
forms. From a long-run historical perspective, Europe’s new political adventures have led
leaders within and beyond Europe to see the rest of the world’s political possibilities and
priorities in a different light.
The initiatives of ASEAN leaders to develop ASEAN  to engage China, Japan and
South Korea in more formal multi-lateral discussions has helped to create the conceptual
space in which some scholars are exploring the possibilities of an “East Asian Communi-
ty.” Some efforts to conceptualize an East Asian region or community proceed from the
principles already used in Europe. A proposal by a group of Japanese academics for such
a community appeals to the language and logic utilized in developing the European
Union with an aim to creating formal means to ensure coordinated efforts to promote
regional security, combat international crime, cooperate on disaster relief, and alleviate
poverty. In addition the authors call for cooperation on issues of financial market
regulation and energy policies [Nakamura et al. ]. More generally, the formal political
discussions among the sovereign states and the informal scholarly conversations among
academics both make use of political principles first forged in European diplomatic
discourses. Regional political structures in both East Asia and Europe aim to reduce the
costs of coordinated political decision making and raise the economic benefits available
for more effective integration. Shared subjects of contention also emerge in the East
Asian and European cases regarding what states should or should not be admitted into
the regional groupings. It is thus not surprising that policy makers and academics both
recognize the fundamental role of European political practices in enabling similar possi-
ble developments elsewhere. The reasons for such a view are understandable intellectual
extensions from earlier ideas about national state formation based on European models.
But moved to the regional level, some of the difficulties with using European models for
political practices elsewhere become clearer than they have been when approached at the
national level.
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Prominent in recent debates about the formation of an East Asian “community”
(ky¶d¶tai) has been the role of China in such a regional political structure. Some analysts
actively oppose the formation of any kind of East Asian community based on the belief
that it would be a vehicle for Chinese leaders to promote their hegemonic position across
the region. Others prefer to see Australia and New Zealand added to the ASEAN 
group for regional meetings in order to increase the weight of democratic regimes in the
formation of the region. From beyond the region, however defined, some observers view
a United States opposing any regional grouping that compromises its ability to negotiate
bilateral arrangements with individual states and more generally its capacities to influ-
ence international politics in the region. Amidst the different perspectives and priorities
of actors within and beyond East and Southeast Asia it is clear that a turn to ASEAN
 after  took place as APEC was increasingly viewed as ineffective and in-
appropriate for what many leaders in East and Southeast Asia thought desirable politic-
ally and economically [Stubbs ; Yu ].
The kinds of actors and their issues regarding the development of more formal
political structures across East Asia are quite different from those in Europe. It is no
wonder that few if any analysts can imagine an East Asian Community closely resembl-
ing the European Union to be likely soon, if ever. Moreover, there is no consensus on what
the desirable goals should be regarding political relations and organizations involving
sovereign states in the region. The political viability of an East Asian Community rests
in part on the ability and desire of the major powers in the region, Chinese and Japanese
stakeholders, to find that the advantages of collective coordination outweigh those of
competition and possible conflict. They could decide that the costs of formal coordination
are too high and that their interests are better served by more informal efforts to keep
relations on a stable footing. Moreover, despite the EU’s far greater formal structure, its
effectiveness at addressing some pressing issues has not always been up to the standards
achieved across ASEAN monetary policy responses to the financial crisis of
autumn  being an obvious example of far greater coordination in East Asia than in
Europe.
An example here or there of East Asian regional cooperation appearing more
effective than what occurs in the EU notwithstanding, the temptation to assume the EU
supplies norms and models for others to consider if not emulate, is strong. Yet, the
European Union is not a practical model. Its salience is an extension of earlier assump-
tions about European national state formation providing norms and models for state
making elsewhere and due to the absence of any other easily available models. It remains
easy to assume that European political practices represent more advanced possibilities
that others should consider. The EU remains an ideal against which East Asia, however
constructed, can never measure up.
Policy makers and academics are well aware that the EU and East Asian regional




scholars and practitioners in East Asia remains strong as Giovanni Capannelli of the
Asian Development Bank expressed clearly in :
The EU is often presented as the integration model for other regional groupings, in Asia
and elsewhere. But while regions can learn from others’ experiences, their needs and circum-
stances vary. Asia must find its own path to greater cooperation and integration. This
requires visionaries, people with great ideas whoas Jean Monnet, Robert Schumann, and
Altiero Spinelli did in Europecan influence opinion makers, inspire national leaders, and
eventually enable the region to speak with a more prominent common voice in global
forums. [Capannelli ]
His counsel was perhaps a bit ironic since ASEAN’s historical roots and major purposes
until quite recently have been to give Southeast Asian governments a platform from
which to speak with the powerful countries outside the immediate area [Pollard ].
The EU’s formation was driven far more by awareness of advantages to be gained
economically and politically within the region rather than for the region as a whole with
those beyond its borders. More recently, concern for how effectively ASEAN is organized
as a region has been raised with a desire for groups within civil society to gain a greater
voice in a regional context [Focus on the Global South ]. Others have made clear that
regional integration is complicated by the competing interests of different actors on any
given issue, such as the development of a gas pipeline by ASEAN [Carroll and Sovacool
]. What emerges from varied assessments of politics and economics in East and
Southeast Asia is that there are ways in which relations within the region are often
distinct from more general global relations. Regionalism can even define a path toward
globalization economically as an Asian Development Bank report concluded in 	
Southeast Asian economies can pursue globalism through greater regional integration
with China [Roland-Holst, Azis and Liu 	].
In order to gain additional perspectives on regional political formations in the
contemporary world and in particular on the ways in which a region composed of
ASEAN 	 is an East Asia different from the Europe defined by the EU if we can
consider the EU as the outcome of particular historical processes quite unlike those found
in East Asia. To appreciate some of these differences, a historical contrast of Chinese and
European political transformations is offered below.
Global Processes or Regional Processes: European State Making and Beyond
To think in new ways about how we can evaluate East Asia’s future political possibilities
I wish to propose another way to look at the relationship between states and regions. We
begin in the distant past. If we go back  years to the time of the Han and Roman
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empires we discover political regimes that in their territory and population were very
similar. Both the Han and Roman empires achieved the same geographical scale of .
(Roman empire) to . (Han empire) million square miles. The Han empire’s population
reached some  million people and the Roman empire’s population about  million;
together they accounted for over half of the world’s total population. Both regimes also
owe their collapses to a combination of internal difficulties and challenges from military
foes sharing common historical roots on the steppes. But where Europe enters what was
once dramatically called the “Dark Ages” characterized by simple subsistence economies
and small states, empire re-emerged on the Chinese mainland. The differences are not
principally the result of different aspirations of political leaders. The strongest successors
to both the Han and Roman empires wished to achieve control over the peoples and lands
once ruled by their imperial predecessors. But the political ideas and bureaucratic
institutions fostering the recreation and consolidation of empire developed through the
first millennium of Chinese imperial history so that the logic of agrarian empire was
consolidated and viable from the Mongol reunification of China in the thirteenth century
to the collapse of the Manchu’s empire in the early twentieth century without interrup-
tion.	) During this same stretch of centuries, European political leaders managed to reduce
the number of small independent political regimes through a process of national state
formation, the very process that created the template for institutional features we have
for states world-wide today [Tilly 
]. But large European states (still far less than the
spatial scale of Chinese empires), were rare: Charlemagne held together a large state for
one generation in the era of the Tang empire, while Napoleon and Hitler in very different
ways briefly held authority over territories spanning several European states. But from
a Chinese political perspective, Europeans, after the fall of the Roman empire, always
lived in a politically fragmented region with states that for the most part had very
limited capacities to govern their subject populations. Only in the late twentieth-century
formation of the European Union have leaders begun to fashion a center of authority
over a territory and population reaching toward the scale that Chinese political leaders
have enjoyed for centuries. This sort of comparison is rarely made. The thought of
evaluating European political transformations according to a standard derived from
Chinese history is awkward if not absurd. We have little difficulty explaining that the
European Union should not be seen as a weaker and more limited version of the Chinese
state; we cannot imagine Chinese political ideas and institutions providing a useful set of
standards for assessing what the EU may or may not become. Yet the implications of our
inability to use Chinese experiences as a useful baseline for observing European political
changes for the symmetrically limited utility of using European metric for evaluating the
Chinese state is almost never drawn out. Recognizing the limits of European state
	 This contrasting set of historical experiences is discussed more fully in chapter 
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transformations to explain the nature of the Chinese state gives us a different perspective
from which to view the inabilities of EU formation to guide our understanding of
regional political possibilities in East Asia.
Contrasting China and the EU suggests how the EU is a weak state from a Chinese
perspective, a comparison that complements the more obvious comparison of regional
political ties in East Asia being weak compared to those in the EU. Together the two
comparisons suggest that we more carefully consider what the similarities and differ-
ences in comparisons tell us about what to expect in the two cases. The ways in which the
EU is seeking to create a level of spatial authority similar to that achieved earlier and by
a different path in China includes facing similar challenges of defining relations between
center and lower levels of authority, of defining the range of variations in policies and the
core of common principles, and finding ways to balance administrative effectiveness and
political voice for citizens. Structural challenges are similar despite the menu of ideolog-
ical and institutional choices available in China and Europe being very different. Europe-
ans are seeking to build on the foundations of sovereign states with equal diplomatic
status and offer a new governmental center able to administer key issues in standard and
uniform ways across all of these states. Looking at what makes China and the EU
comparable also informs what limits the comparison of East Asia with the EU.
At the same time as Europeans are searching for ways to create vertical political
structures over diplomatically equal sovereign states, some people in East Asia are trying
to use the principles of Westphalia to increase relations among states that have no
common tradition of diplomacy and for whom the most salient ideal principles of past
inter-state relations were the hierarchical notions promoted by the Chinese empire. Such
language is unappealing to Chinese and everyone else today. The lack of usable historical
precedents within East Asia makes the appeal to European conventions understandable
for ordering relations in East Asia. Of course the ideals of the political equality of
sovereign states formulated in the Treaty of Westphalia in  were intended to improve
relations among competitive regimes that together ruled less territory and far fewer
people than were to be found in the same period in Qing China, let alone in China and her
neighbors together. What was true in  remains true todayEuropean states are
smaller and more similar to each other culturally, economically and politically than are
China and its neighbors. These greater similarities exist despite Europeans crafting
separate social identities based on different national pasts. EU leaders and member states
are hardly equal to each other in their economic and political power even as they enjoy
similar rights within the organization. The leaders among them have to reach a common
understanding on issues for the group more generally to succeed. This regional political
logic is more difficult if not impossible in East Asia because of China’s great size. One
might imagine that this means China doesn’t need coalition building but to the contrary
its large size makes it harder for the country to take a diplomatic lead in developing a
larger regional community. Such a move came after  from Southeast Asia, what had
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been in an earlier era a periphery of China. A very different political and economic
situation than existed centuries earlier has fostered the creation of a very different kind
of East Asian region in both political and economic terms today.
Political and economic change in today’s world as well as the dynamics that pro-
duced very different kinds of states and economic change in the past have regional
features. Europe’s modern state formation experience is perhaps best understood as a
regional phenomenon that has had significance for other parts of the world without
being the simple and sole model that it implicitly is assumed to be in most research. If we
are to learn how better to anticipate and guide political change outside Europe, we might
be well served by learning better how to explain political change in the past in other
world regions, like East Asia. This essay suggests some elements of a strategy that
recognizes the spatial similarities between the Chinese empire and European states, a
similarity between the imperial Chinese empire and early modern European states which
help us see how different any East Asian region will likely be from Europe as a region.
There is no one way to compare political changes in Europe with those in East Asia.
Recognizing the usefulness of contrasting a European region with the single country of
China especially makes sense as Europe adopts more formal political characteristics.
Over this same period of Europe-wide political integration we see that Southeast Asia has
had more and more political and economic ties with China and Japan. While these do not
promise to lead to a community like the European Union, the European Union, for its
part, will never become very similar to the People’s Republic of China. Together these
observations suggest a more open approach to multiple comparisons that together can
sharpen our awareness of both similarities and differences between the kinds of states
and political relations they have within and across different world regions.
Regions need not have any fixed and formal status like that of sovereign states in
order to be useful units for scholarly analysis. They can change over time with the
emergence and decline of particular political and economic ties or social and cultural
connections among people. Understanding how regions can expand and contract and
when they are especially important and relatively insignificant frames of reference for
political activities will likely be enhanced by viewing them in historical perspective.
Guided by this approach, what we conventionally call Southeast Asia has only sometimes
had close and important relations with what we call East Asia, but we make understand-
ing the nature of those relations difficult to evaluate because we take their separation as
the norm and evaluate their possible relations according to practices first initiated in
Europe. We need not be intellectual prisoners of this particular geopolitical vision of the
world.
In conclusion, perhaps we can offer a response to the query posed in this essay’s
subtitle“Is Southeast Asia (ever) part of East Asia?” Yes, the area referred to in the
post-World War II American definition of Southeast Asia is indeed sometimes part of a
larger region we can call East Asia. We need geographical labels which can identify parts
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of the world in which human activity takes place between the local and the global and
across national political borders, but we need not continue to accept those we have
inherited. An East Asia that includes China, Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia may be
a more useful first approximation than the still conventional East Asia and Southeast
Asia that shape not only our textbooks and our teaching but also the ways we approach
much of our research.
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